Beitrag, Englisch, 15 Seiten, TU Braunschweig Economics Department Working Paper Series
Autor: Dr. Uwe Kratzsch
Herausgeber / Co-Autor: TU Braunschweig, Economics Department
Erscheinungsdatum: 2011
Quelle: TU Braunschweig, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
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This paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly renegotiation-proof and subgame perfect equilibria in a game of international emission reduction exist if countries put a sufficiently high weight on future payoffs, even though there is a discontinuity in the required discount factor due to the integrity of the number of punishing countries. Treaties are easier to reach if the gas depreciates slowly.
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