An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases
An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases

An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases

Beitrag, Englisch, 15 Seiten, TU Braunschweig Economics Department Working Paper Series

Autor: Dr. Uwe Kratzsch

Herausgeber / Co-Autor: TU Braunschweig, Economics Department

Erscheinungsdatum: 2011

Quelle: TU Braunschweig, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre


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TU Braunschweig Economics Department Working Paper Series

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This paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly renegotiation-proof and subgame perfect equilibria in a game of international emission reduction exist if countries put a sufficiently high weight on future payoffs, even though there is a discontinuity in the required discount factor due to the integrity of the number of punishing countries. Treaties are easier to reach if the gas depreciates slowly.

Fachthemen

Dr. Uwe Kratzsch

DE

Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter

Publikationen: 9

Aufrufe seit 12/2007: 2951
Aufrufe letzte 30 Tage: 1