The European Constitution and the Imperatives of Transnational Democracy

Democracy is traditionally associated with the sovereign nation-state, wherein a constitutionally guaranteed separation of powers ensures the rule of law and decision-making are rooted in the sovereign will of the citizens (“the people”). Whenever competences are delegated to a supranational authority, or transferred to an intergovernmental entity or a transnational framework of decision-making, the loss of democratic control on the part of the polity of the nation-state has to be counterbalanced by complex procedures of checks and balances at the international level. The “erosion of democracy through delegation” (from the state to a supranational entity) has been the structural problem of the European Communities and the European Union ever since their foundation. This paper analyses to what extent the Constitution for Europe, drafted by an Intergovernmental Conference (on the basis of the proposal by the Convention on the Future of Europe) and adopted by the Heads of State and Government in the Treaty and Final Act on 29 October 2004 in Rome, gives redress to the democracy and legitimation deficit of the European project.